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Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency
in Armaments

STATEMENTS MADE IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
ON AGENDA ITEM 8: TRANSPARENCY IN ARMAMENTS
(CD/PV.657 - CD/PV.672: 29.07.1993-24.02.1994)

Addendum

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Cuba (the President) 29.07.1993

CD/PV.657 pages: 3-4

Another item on which delegations in the Conference are focusing is that of transparency in armaments. Many proposals have been made which will be considered in the course of the present meeting. A topic with an important connection with this item is the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms in which my country will participate with the information that in the course of 1992 it neither imported nor exported any of the armaments included therein. As the Minister of Armed Forces of Cuba declared publicly last April, the Ministry is engaged in reducing troop numbers by 30 per cent, which will ensure that Cuba's armed forces are appropriate to its currrent situation.

The exercise now being carried out in respect of transparency in armaments is of importance within the context of efforts to move forward the process of disarmament and arms control at all levels. Transparency in armaments it has often been said, is not an end in itself. From our standpoint it should contribute to eliminating the scope for aggression by one State against another, placing emphasis on armaments of an offensive and destabilizing nature which might be used in rapid operations. If transparency and the United Nations register do not bring about a reduction in exports of armaments by the main exporters, the value of the exercise will always be limited. The same reasoning applies to the issues of upgrading and development, especially of weapons of mass destruction.

Finland 5.08.1993

CD/PV.658 pages: 10-11

The Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments has been involved in a process through which a global network for the exchange of military information is gradually being built. As the discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee have clearly demonstrated, the area of transparency in armaments is challenging. It touches upon issues relating to excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms on which international efforts are urgently called for in various parts of the world. The complex nature of these issues adds up to the challenge. New global means to increase openness and transparency should be designed so as to allow the widest possible implementation. New instruments must fit different realities.

There seems to be a broadly shared wish to address, as a priority matter, a range of questions that deal with conventional weapons and capabilities. Excessive and destabilizing accumulations of armaments pose a threat to national, regional and international peace and security, particularly by aggravating tensions and conflict situations, giving rise to serious and urgent concerns. It is natural that the consideration of such accumulations of arms should involve relevant information on levels of arms production and military holdings. These concepts - transfers, production and holdings - are distinct by their very nature. Therefore, appropriate regimes designed for them will not necessarily be the same.

Finland continued ....

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We believe that it could be useful to consider aspects relating to national holdings in the context of information on military organizations. In order to identify possible excessive and destabilizing accumulations of armaments one should take into account such questions as the structure, designation and normal peacetime location of units or formations as well as their peacetime personnel strength and combat readiness. Information on weapons and equipment systems disaggregated down to divisional level, for example, would be meaningful. Such an approach would also be reasonable taking into account the varying circumstances in different regions and countries, as well as differences in the size of the armed forces and in the way they have been organized in each country.

The far-reaching commitments that the CSCE countries have agreed among themselves illustrate the great potential there is for strengthening security through increased openness and transparency. We are convinced that the agreed measures to increase openness and transparency have not compromised anyone's legitimate security needs. Discussions at the global level should draw on the experience gained through regional arrangements and the processes leading to them.

The discussions within the CD on transparency in armaments provide useful elements for the work of the group of governmental experts that is to be convened early next year. This group is expected to take the process one step further. Given the existing concerns relating to accumulation of conventional weapons, it would be unrealistic to expect that the whole new item on transparency would be exhausted through that work. Our view is that the world is expecting the disarmament community to continue its efforts in this new and important field. The CD certainly should continue to do its share and maintain the item on "Transparency in Armaments" as one of the central questions on its agenda for immediate action.

Islamic Republic of Iran

CD/PV.659

10.08.1993
pages: 7-8,9

Then comes the question of transparency in armaments, an agenda item of the Conference to which my delegation attaches great importance and interest. After some hesitation on the part of developing States, eventual consensus was built around a resolution which provided the basis of further work by the Conference on Disarmament. One would have expected here that, after long discussions and debates preceding the consensus, actual follow-up would tend to be smooth. But again lack of confidence in the intention of powerful countries has manifested itself in the form of real impediments towards progress in this regard.

Islamic Republic of Iran continued .... pages: 7-8, 9

Here the developing countries are faced with uncertainties on four specific grounds. First, like other agreements in the field of disarmament, there should be, and there will be, an enhanced security for all. Yet the selective and discriminatory approach that has been persistent so far, coupled with treatment of countries on the basis of level of political relations, or lack of relations, with powerful countries rather than on the merits of compliance, can put the security of different States at risk. Second, the definition of what lies within the scope of our new endeavours is extremely vague and left for individual interpretations. This may give room to political manipulations of any eventual agreement in this field. Military holdings are a major component in the possible expansion of the Register and should include holdings in other territories as well as military support committed by other States through bilateral or multilateral agreements and pacts. Third, weapons of mass destruction which were agreed to be a part of this exercise, are deliberately subdued, despite the fact that transparency for these weapons has definitely more significant effect and impact on our security than that of conventional weapons. Fourth and foremost, a serious and unfortunately well-justified concern that technology and material related to peaceful use and essential for the development of developing countries will again be denied or severely restricted by newly-made clubs. As regards this last point it is essential to ensure that: availability of material and high technology applicable to civilian use is not hampered; transfer of technology to developing countries is substantially improved and facilitated; export-control regimes are curbed and limited to internationally agreed arrangements; and dual-purpose material and technology, while made more transparent, are not denied.

Transparency in armaments also does not have a chance to get off the ground. No country in the region has yet submitted a set of data for the register of armaments in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 46/36/L. Unfortunately, one can not hope for an improvement of the situation in the Middle East as long as Israel's policies on nuclear weapons remain unaltered.

Initiatives here are, therefore, certain to ensure enhancement of security and stability of the Persian Gulf. Such initiatives may include: regional arrangements towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone and to ensure compliance; cooperation in the areas of peaceful use of nuclear energy; exchange of views on the NPT and the IAEA safeguards and examination of complementary regional verification mechanisms; coordination on ratification and implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention; expert consultations to devise arrangements for verification of the Biological Weapons Convention within the region; development of ways and means to enhance transparency in armaments, including simultaneous periodic data reporting on military holdings; negotiations to curb defence spending and reduce purchases of arms and devote the revenues thus saved to the development of the region; cooperation in conversion of some military production facilities to civilian ones; establishment finally of a forum to discuss security issues, threat perceptions and military doctrines and to arrange confidence-building measures.

Egypt (the President)

This year the Conference on Disarmament has for the first time established an Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments, in response to General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, operative paragraphs 12 to 15. During the second and third parts of the session, over which I had the honour to preside, the Committee has held substantive discussions on various aspects of transparency in armaments and numerous working papers and constructive proposals have been submitted on this important issue. The challenge still facing the Committee is to ensure the timely and successful completion of its work through fruitful discussions and an exchange of views on this issue.

Algeria

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The dominant powers long interpreted multilateral treaties so as to legitimize their preeminence, which was often only that of their weapons. At the same time they refused to admit that the continuation of a race to develop ever more sophisticated arms with ever more "surgical" accuracy was less a reflection of real security or defence needs than of their inability to undertake the necessary conversion of their cumbersome arms industries. The pretext of the cold war no longer being valid, those with direct interests in the military-industrial complexes are now seeking among the upheavals of all sorts shaking the countries of the South elements which might serve as an excuse for their Governments to apply the old policies, either by intervention in the internal disputes of the weaker countries or by maintenance of a frantic rate of renewal of the military technologies that destabilize the balances needed for peace, revive the climate of uncertainty and suspicion and swallow up the funds needed for development. In this respect, my country feels that the excessive arms manufacturing capacity in certain countries and those same countries' propensity systematically to seek military uses for all the fruits of human genius fundamentally discredit their professed commitments to transparency or disarmament. Transparency must not, we feel, be used to distract attention from the need to put an end to the arms race and to undertake the conversion of the tools of arms production.

Furthermore, while there is general agreement that, to be lasting, arms limitation measures should be taken in parallel with the settlement of regional disputes, there is also a need for consensus on the idea that such measures should not serve as a cover for a desire to dismantle the defence potential of countries designated as culprits in advance or the objective of protecting one of the protagonists in situations of regional rivalry. It is obvious that international disputes often have an effect on the internal affairs of neighbouring countries that are not direct parties to them. More precisely, we believe that there is a lesson to be learnt from this for us all, so that there is no recurrence of the process of over armament and destruction of which a country in the Middle East has been subject, a process of which, in the final analysis, the only beneficiaries have been arms industries. Similarly, we must ask ourselves whether it is right to provide a State party to a regional conflict with the means to enable it to perpetrate an avowed policy of hegemony and domination.

Third, our delegation, understanding the importance of the issue of the transparency of arms supplies for the strengthening of non-proliferation regimes and of overall stability and predictability, is actively participating in the work of the relevant ad hoc committee and is contributing, or trying to contribute to the search for the necessary arrangements.

In this connection, I would like to dwell in the problem of export control, and on an aspect of that control of which we have unfortunately yet to hear in this forum. I am referring to the activities of the Coordinating Committee, otherwise known as CoCom, and, to be more precise, to its discriminatory practices with regard to Russia. As it is well known, fundamental changes have taken place in the international arena and the "cold war" is now a thing of the past. It might be thought that its ugly attributes should also have vanished without trace, but that has not happened and CoCom continues to try to impose on Russia its discredited rules of the game. The position of the Russian Federation on this issue is clear: CoCom's discriminatory policy and practices must be ended. That would be in keeping with the way things are today. But if this institution is to be retained, would it not be better to transform it into an instrument of constructive cooperation for non-proliferation purposes?

We are prepared to contribute towards that, including through practical steps taken by ourselves, for example the introduction in Russia of an effective system of export controls harmonized with existing international regimes in this field. I would like to inform you that we are now seriously examining the possibility of participating in the MTCR. In the circumstances we justifiably expect that the discriminatory measures impeding Russia's access to the world market of space services will be lifted.

The confrontation in such matters along North/South lines must also be overcome. That will, of course, require complementary efforts both from States supplying, and from States receiving high technology, including from their representatives to the Conference on Disarmament when we consider, for example, the problem of increasing transparency in the field of technology transfer.

Let me now move to the question of transparency in armaments. From the very beginning, my delegation has seen the merit in the establishment of an international code of conduct on arms transfers as well as military holdings in order to promote confidence among nations, thereby contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security in this era of uncertainty. Hence Indonesia was among those who voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 46/36 L regarding transparency in armaments, in which the Member States agreed inter alia to establish a United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. In order to contribute to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, the Indonesian Government is now in the process of collecting armament data and military information as required by the resolution. As soon as this exercise is completed, we shall not fail to submit the relevant data on international arms transfers, military holdings, procurement through national production and any other relevant policies to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We believe that once all United Nations Member States have submitted the information required, the Register will constitute an important instrument for confidence-building among States, especially those in areas of high tension.

We have, however, to be consistent in addressing the question of transparency in armaments. Any efforts to purposely dilute the aim and arbitrarily reduce the scope of transparency in armaments would run the risk of adversely creating another discriminatory non-proliferation regime, and thus would not be acceptable to my delegation. The same consideration applies to any action to misuse the instrument which would abusively hamper the legitimate access of all countries, especially the developing countries, to advanced technology urgently needed for development purposes. It is within this context that my delegation would like, at this juncture, to reiterate its full support to the statement made on behalf of the majority of the Group of 21 countries, as contained in document CD/TIA/WP.16, which stated that the Conference on Disarmament should address the matter in a non-discriminatory and comprehensive manner, so as to cover all categories and types of arms, including weapons of mass destruction, stockpiles, indigenous production and weapons undergoing research, development, testing and evaluation. By the same token, it is our considered opinion that transparency in armaments should not be treated over-simplistically, but instead should be addressed in such a manner as to take into account the specific characteristics of a given State and its regional environment, as well as its legitimate right to self-defence in conformity with article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Being a spread-out archipelagic State consisting of more than 13,000 islands with a population of nearly 200 million, for example, Indonesia's requirements for protecting its territorial integrity and national sovereignty would be necessarily different from those of landlocked countries or more compact States with smaller populations. Furthermore, bearing in mind the complex issues that remain unaddressed surrounding the subject of transparency in armaments, it would be appropriate for us to underline the recommendation of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments that the said Ad Hoc Committee be re-established at the beginning of the 1994 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Czech Republic

page: 11

We share widely expressed views concerning weapons of mass destruction, efforts to prevent proliferation of these weapons and their delivery vehicles, arms transfers, transparency in armaments and other confidence-building measures. The Czech Republic is actively participating in a number of groups aimed at relevant export control and we consider joining those multilateral arrangements of which we are not yet full members, like, for instance, the Missile Technology Control Regime or the Australia Group. In this connection we cannot but welcome the enhanced attention the CD is paying to transparency in armaments. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is an important step in the right direction and the Czech Republic has decided to participate in the first exchange of relevant data in spite of the fact that the separation of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic caused us some difficulties in completing the required information. Transparency in armaments may be considered one of the longer-term tasks for the Conference on Disarmament. This, however, does not make it less important. If the right decisions are taken on this path we shall be rewarded in future by enhanced security for all.

Egypt (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments) CD/PV.664 2.09.1993 pages: 5-6

I have the honour to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. The report, circulated in document CD/1218 dated 24 August 1993, covers the activity of the Committee during this year's session. I wanted to remind you that this was the first year in which an ad hoc committee on this subject was established. Nevertheless, last year I had the pleasure of serving as Special Coordinator of the Conference on the same issue and chaired to that effect informal meetings of the CD. Although the discussions were rather preliminary last year, due to the demands of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, I recall stating here in plenary at the end of the 1992 session that the results achieved on this item went beyond expectations, and the report contained a rather extensive outline of the various subjects addressed. This year we entered into very substantive discussions on the complex issues surrounding this item. Eighteen working papers were presented on various in-depth aspects of the topic, and several of them contained concrete proposals for practical measures to increase openness and transparency. The secretariat prepared a number of background documents as well. The Committee followed closely its programme of work, which is reflected in the report. In the section which describes the substantive work of the 1993 session we have some rather general descriptions and remarks, followed by sections on the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms, military holdings and procurement through national production, arms transfers and transfer of high technology with military applications, and weapons of mass destruction, as well as conclusions and recommendations.

Egypt (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments) continued .... pages: 5-6

To the extent possible the report also adhered to the guidelines on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, bearing in mind that since that was the first year of the Ad Hoc Committee, the views of countries should be made known, and therefore it is perhaps longer than other reports. The exchange of views and consultations were generally held in an atmosphere of cooperation and maintaining the spirit of dialogue, and I wish to thank all participating delegations, as well as the group coordinators - I refer in particular to the coordinator of the Group of 21, Cuba, the coordinator of the Western group, the United Kingdom, and the coordinator of the Eastern group, Bulgaria. I wish also to thank the delegations of China and Sweden at this juncture. There was goodwill on the part of all and a spirit of compromise characterized the deliberations of the Committee. The Committee benefited from the presentations of a number of experts, who added a pragmatic perspective to our proceedings, and I wish to express my appreciation to them.

Although various views were expressed on various ideas and proposals, it was agreed that an increased level of openness and transparency in the field of armaments may enhance trust and confidence among countries, help ease tension and conflicts, promote stability and strengthen regional and international peace and security. Nevertheless, it was underlined that transparency is not an end in itself, nor is it to be pursued for its own sake. It was also agreed that transparency could contribute to restraint in production and transfers of arms, thus encouraging countries not to seek levels of armaments exceeding their legitimate security requirements and taking due account of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence as provided for in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Transparency coupled with restraint and responsible policies of arms transfers increases confidence among countries and therefore enhances security and stability around the world. A gradual approach was advocated in the field of transparency in armaments in order to contribute to confidence-building and security among countries.

Delegations agreed in the Ad Hoc Committee that further consideration should be devoted to the issues under discussion and proposals which were made on this item. The Committee therefore recommends in its report that it should be re-established at the beginning of the 1994 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Egypt (the President) CD/PV.665 3.09.1993 page: 15

The Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments, which I had the honour to chair, was able to look carefully at the various issues under its mandate, as derived from General Assembly resolution 46/36L. While the discussions were not conclusive in this Committee, they did in fact result in a significant degree of mutual understanding, transparency and openness. Eighteen excellent working papers were also submitted to the Committee by various delegations and will help to enrich the discussions on this topic in the 1994 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

The question of transparency in armaments is no less important. United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/36 L gives the Conference on Disarmament a well-defined responsibility in expanding the Register on transfers of conventional arms and in extending the field of transparency to weapons of mass destruction and transfers of technology for military purposes. The Conference must therefore continue its efforts in order to make its own contribution.

Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

pages: 8-9

"Transparency in armaments has now become an important new focus of your endeavours. The establishment of the Register of Conventional Arms is an event of great importance. The potential of the Register as a confidence-building measure through increased openness and transparency in military matters cannot be overemphasized. I am pleased that more than 80 States, including most major arms suppliers and recipient States, have provided information to the Register in its first year of operation, thus making most of the world's trade in major conventional arms transparent. Later this year, a group of experts will be convened to consider the continued operation of the Register and its expansion: this might include the addition of further categories of equipment, and data on military holdings and procurement through national production. This would result in a far-reaching international confidence-building tool which could create unprecedented transparency both in the international arms trade and in the national production of arms. It could also culminate in the establishment of an early-warning system which would pave the way for the reduction of conventional armaments to the lowest possible level consistent with the principle of the legitimate security needs of States. I therefore urge you to continue to address this issue with determination, with a view to contributing to this goal, and thus to ensuring that disarmament and arms control play a major part in the efforts of the United Nations in the field of preventive diplomacy and peace-making.

United States

pages: 14, 19

The end of the cold war has created particular opportunities for the CD, and I am here today to pledge to you that the United States will do everything in its power to make the most of them. In this regard, I would like to read out to you a message to the Conference from President Clinton:

> "I am grateful for the opportunity to address all those who are participating in the Conference on Disarmament. This Conference has several important items on its agenda as the 1994 session begins, including transparency in armaments, and it may assume others, ..."

The immediate challenge to this forum is to promote greater transparency about security matters. Transparency in turn fosters the greater confidence and trust upon which stable political relationships can rest. Last year the CD created an Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments (TIA). As the first new committee established by the CD in a number of years, it demonstrated the CD's ability to adapt to the challenges of the post-cold-war era. It is important as well because it is the only item on your agenda that addresses the conventional arms challenge. I strongly encourage you to build on the very useful work begun in the TIA Ad Hoc Committee last year. I also recommend the ideas put forward last year by the United States to promote transparency regarding conventional arms.

Some object that we should instead pay even more attention to weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them. Let us discuss those concerns seriously, but let us not create yet another setting where we repeat ourselves endlessly to the point where other important business is neglected. If we slacken in our willingness to address the conventional weapons problems that first gave rise to the TIA initiative, we will not make much progress, and we will begin to slide away from our global conventional arms control objectives. Just as in the nuclear area, the work done here in Geneva on conventional arms will have a significant impact on related efforts elsewhere. We share your pride in the successful initiation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. The first year's experience with the Register was good - but not good enough. Eighty-two responses represent answers from less than half the United Nation's membership. We must do better; our goal should be universal participation, which your work here at the CD can encourage.

The United States also looks forward to the experts' meeting on these issues in New York next month. We will play an active part in moving their efforts to a successful conclusion.

Netherlands

CD/PV.667

27.01.1994
pages: 7 - 8

Let me now turn to what in the view of the Netherlands delegation is the most important area of conventional disarmament the Conference has to deal with in 1994: transparency in armaments. The history of transparency in armaments, and notably the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, is by now well known. With the establishment of the Register, the General Assembly requested the CD to address a number of aspects of openness and transparency in armaments. In order to deal with these requests the Conference at the beginning of its 1993 session established the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. Under the able leadership of Ambassador Mounir Zahran, who in 1992 had served as a special coordinator for transparency in armaments, the Ad Hoc Committee in 1993 held 15 meetings in the course of which a great amount of new ground was covered and many views were expressed on the General Assembly's requests.

From its report, we learn that the Ad Hoc Committee conducted a substantive exchange of views on a number of complex issues surrounding the subject of transparency in armaments. Also, a number of interesting thoughts and proposals were expressed on the present and future functioning of the Register, for instance that States should start exchanging information on military holdings and procurement through national production and the proposal that States could make an annual declaration to the United Nations on the size and organization of their forces. However, no consensus recommendations could be reached as to any of these proposals. The fact that an Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments has been re-established holds out promising prospects for sustaining and expanding the progress made in Geneva last year. The CD should apply some urgency here, since, outside Geneva, the work of the CD will have to be taken into account by the 1994 Group of Governmental Experts on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

The fact that the Register is widely supported was reflected in the adoption by an overwhelming majority of resolution 46/36 L, which established the Register, and the consensus by which resolutions on transparency in armaments and the Register were adopted in the subsequent years. The broad support for the Register was further evidenced by the satisfying level of participation by United Nations Member States over the first operational year of the Register, 1992. During the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, a report of the Secretary-General was published (A/48/344) which lists 80 national returns. More returns have come in since.

The Netherlands considers this to be a good and promising start. The public data now available through the Register create transparency in conventional arms transfers and thus effectively contribute to building confidence among the community of States. Here, I would say we are faced with a critical innovation, if not a quantum leap to greater trust. The data, being government-supplied, obtain official status. Not only is existing knowledge on arms transfers confirmed and supplemented, but the returns to the Register also qualify henceforth as objects for official government-to-government communications.

Netherlands continued .... page: 8

The Secretary-General of the United Nations has bestowed the honour upon the Netherlands to chair the New York Group of Governmental Experts to which I just referred. It will meet three times between February and August 1994, and has the important task to assist the Secretary-General in preparing a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development. In doing so the Group of Experts will have to take into account, inter alia, the work of our Conference on the issue. However, the Group derives its mandate from resolution 46/36 L and consequently remains directly responsible to the General Assembly and the Secretary-General. The report of the Group of Governmental Experts will be submitted to the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly. It goes without saying that the Netherlands is fully prepared to continue its contribution to the efforts the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament undertake to enhance the transparency drive. Greater transparency contributes to building confidence and trust among States and increases stability in all regions of the world. It also holds out the prospect of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments. Transparency thereby enables nations to make more adequate use of scarce socio-economic resources in a more secure world. It is in a secure environment that investment flourishes.

Germany page: 11

As to transparency in armaments, last year's Ad Hoc Committee conducted a substantive exchange of views on how to respond to the request of the United Nations General Assembly in 1992 that openness and transparency in this field be further increased. A number of proposals were presented. We expect that constructive efforts be undertaken to continue this important task in the relevant Ad Hoc Committee. Furthermore, we are looking forward to the activities of the group of governmental experts in New York, under the able guidance of Ambassador Wagenmakers, which aim to assess the operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and put forward proposals for its further development.

I take the view that, as mentioned in the German 10-point initiative on non-proliferation, transparency in armaments should not be limited to conventional arms. There should be considerations for enhancing transparency in the field of nuclear weapons as well. The idea of a nuclear-weapon register or a register on nuclear disarmament aims towards strengthening international confidence in nuclear disarmament. Such a register may be a possible complement to the confidence-building policy we helped to implement when establishing the Register of conventional weapons at the United Nations. I look forward to the continuation of this debate in this year's Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments.

Finland

CD/PV.668

01.02.1994
pages: 3-4

Questions related to conventional weapons and forces require growing attention. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms provides a worldwide effort in promoting stability and security through increased openness and transparency. The number of returns for the first data collection last year was promising. In further efforts, increasing the number of countries providing requested information for the Register is an important goal. The Group of Governmental Experts that will meet during this year in New York will address further possibilities to develop the Register. The experience gained in the European context proves that there is a wide range of possibilities to increase openness and transparency. The CD, for its part, is expected to contribute in the area of transparency in armaments.

Belgium

pages: 12-13

Just a year ago the Conference, in drawing up the treaty on chemical weapons, proved that a few countries - if they were motivated by sufficient determination - could devise a system of international commitments that was subsequently endorsed by four fifths of the States on the planet. To what do we owe this success? I think essentially to our methods of work. As they are based on the rule of consensus, we could not build rules to be imposed on a country unless it had previously accepted them. We could persuade, we could not impose. Hence the importance of mutual confidence in all our work. We may have different approaches, often we even have divergent philosophies, but if we have a common aim, if we have the will to reach it, we will succeed if we maintain a climate of total confidence among us. This climate of confidence made possible the drawing up of the treaty on chemical weapons, which remains to date the CD's best claim to fame, but it also presides over the work of the various ad hoc groups of the Conference. We can even see it in the title of some, as in the case of NSAs, but we see it above all in the entire philosophy which determines our work: how can we speak of transparency in armaments, how can we accept the principle of participating in arms registers, if there is not at the base this confidence that I am referring to here? In this body we have created a climate of collective confidence; it generated equally collective responsibility.

Romania

CD/PV.669

03.02.1994
pages: 5,8

We share widely expressed views concerning weapons of mass destruction, efforts to prevent proliferation of these weapons and their delivery vehicles, arms transfers, transparency in armaments and other confidence-building measures. In our opinion, treaties on weapons of mass impact and export control regimes are complementary, interlocking parts of international security. Export control regimes are meant to make it easier for any recipient State to acquire whatever technology it needs for its peaceful development. States that strictly abide by non-proliferation regimes should have no reason to complain about such regimes. That is why Romania actively participates in a number of groups and regimes aimed at developing responsible proliferation control, not only of nuclear, biological and chemical arms, but also of long-range delivery systems and dual-use technologies. My country is considering joining those multilateral arrangements of which is not yet a full member such as, for instance, MTCR and the Australia Group. In fact, my Government has already publicly committed itself to comply with the guidelines and the spirit of such international groupings and regimes and has developed national legislation accordingly.

The distressing events and armed conflicts occurring in various parts of the world, notably Eastern Europe, clearly prove the consequences of unbridled and excessive accumulation of conventional weapons. That is why Romania attaches just as much importance to the control of increasingly dangerous conventional arms as to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass impact. Against this background, the area of "transparency in armaments" is indeed challenging. It touches upon issues relating to excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms on which international efforts are urgently called for in various parts of the world. As the President of Romania, His Excellency Mr. Ion Iliescu, stated last June before the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament, the overall aspects regarding "transparency in armaments" could be regulated through an international treaty of universal vocation, which would set standards and procedures, as well as appropriate implementation mechanisms. Agreed "guidelines" to serve as an "international code of conduct" could be a first step to this end.

Romania continued .... page: 8

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is an important component of "transparency in armaments". Some 82 States, including Romania, have by now submitted data on their imports and exports of conventional weapons. This is a promising start, although broader participation remains essential. In our opinion, the Register could establish an international code of conduct for the purposes of controlling arms transfers and the activities of weapons suppliers in accordance with universally applicable rules and standards. Romania will maintain its efforts to carry this important confidence-building initiative further. I warmly congratulate Ambassador György Boytha of Hungary on his election as Chairman of the TIA Ad Hoc Committee. I am sure that under his able guidance this Committee will register further notable progress.

Japan page: 11

As to transparency in armaments (TIA), last year the Conference established, for the first time in its history, an Ad Hoc Committee on TIA where a number of concrete proposals were put forward and intensive discussions were carried out. My delegation was encouraged by these developments. As for the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, more than 80 countries participated in its first year, which is, in our view, worth appreciation as a good start. This year, there will be three meetings of the governmental experts to discuss further development of the Register. Japan looks forward to a successful outcome of the meetings. Also here in the Conference on Disarmament, we should continue our deliberations on TIA as an important issue which requires sustained efforts. We congratulate Ambassador Boytha of Hungary on his assumption of the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA. We hope that more constructive deliberations than last year will be made, in particular on the question of military holdings and procurement through national production.

Bulgaria

CD/PV.670

10.02.94
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In the field of conventional arms control we supported greater transparency through the United Nations Register, which had a successful start last year. Our country was one of the 82 States that submitted the data required for the Register. We are in favour of the strict regulation of the arms trade and prevention of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms. Bulgaria will take part in the work of the group of governmental experts who are to prepare a review conference on the Convention on weapons that may be deemed to be excessively injurious or have indiscriminate effects.

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Bulgaria strictly abides by its obligations as a party to the existing export control regimes. My country is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zanger Committee. The guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group are an indispensable part of existing national legislation on export control policy. This, we believe, strengthens the main objectives of the non-proliferation regime.

Bulgaria's interest in progress on the question of transparency in armaments and the exchange of information, on an unofficial basis, is understandable having in mind the situation in the Balkans. My country proceeds from considerations of principle and calls for measures aimed at increasing transparency both on a regional and on a global scale. The universal participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons, which should take into account also the acquisition of such weapons - including international arms transfers, military holdings and procurement through national production - is just a first step. The Conference on Disarmament would fulfil its function if it manages to give its share also to solve the problem of limiting conventional weapons production and their transfers. In this respect the Conference on Disarmament should have clear ideas on the results from the first year's functioning of the United Nations Register and its contribution to the extension of transparency in armaments, the strengthening of confidence and early warning mechanisms.

We intend to conduct negotiations and accede to the MTCR and abide by the relevant commitments stipulated by this regime in the very near future.

While the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction deserves the highest priority, we must not overlook the importance of international efforts in the field of reduction of conventional weapons. As was demonstrated during the Gulf war, unlimited and uncontrolled transfers of conventional weapons can destabilize a whole region, and thus provoke an armed conflict. It goes without saying that supplier States have to conduct a responsible policy in this field. But it is also the responsibility of the international community to undertake coordinated measures aimed at prevention of the unregulated and uncontrolled sale of weapons. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is an important element of international efforts in this field. Ukraine shares and supports the purposes of this regime, and first of all the achievement of greater transparency in the sphere of the transfer of armaments. In our view, in addition to the global approach, regional cooperation should be promoted as well. This would include the development of additional measures on transparency adjusted to the specific conditions existing in each region. Ukraine supports the decision of the Conference to continue the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments in 1994, and has the intention to furnish data to the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms on an annual basis.

Hungary

Pages: 15, 17-18

In 1993, just a few weeks after the chemical weapons Convention had been signed by more than 100 States, a number of opening statements raised a quiet question mark about the very sense of the CD's future. Yet again, the Conference stepped up and responded positively, by mandating an Ad Hoc Committee on the promising issue of transparency in armaments, conducting a lively and progressive debate in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and reaching a breakthrough decision to give this Committee a negotiating mandate. I do sincerely hope that at the beginning of the 1995 session we will be able to look back at 1994 as a year that kept up with the emerging trend.

Last but not least, I wish to stress that increased openness and transparency have gained wide recognition in matters of international security. In fact, the notion of transparency is present in nearly every item on our agenda, be it the concept of open seismic stations, the problem of data accessibility in the NTB verification system or the need for a transparent negotiating process on other questions. The issue of transparency in armaments, which is about to celebrate its second anniversary on the agenda of the Conference, is also an expression of the recognition that transparency and openness can have a significant contribution to reducing tensions and enhancing stability. Existing transparency regimes, like the United Nations standardized system for reporting military expenditure or the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, add further pieces to the emerging trend and serve as reliable proof that transparency is not merely a useful but an ever more indispensable element of the new generation of tools backing up preventive diplomacy. We keep emphasizing that transparency in armaments is basically a cooperative undertaking, giving participants an impetus on the road to building trust. The possibilities of its development should be continuously explored.

The initial experience we have gained so far in these areas is necessarily marked by the difficulties of pioneering. More than 80 countries, including the most important exporters of arms, replied to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. This covers some 50 per cent of the United Nations membership, but one should also keep in mind that these countries provide for more than 90 per cent of global arms exports. Quite a number of States have already indicated further possibilities of developing the register by entering information not only on transfers of arms but also data about military holdings, responding to the general invitation to this

end. Due to the limited time available, the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments could only take a first look at a number of promising and exciting ideas. In a number of instances we reached the phase of formulating general objectives of our work which, however, call for further definitions that would enable us to proceed to the elaboration of appropriate means of pursuing them.

The task in front of us during the course of this year is to explore possible ways and means of increasing transparency in arms. Our starting basis should be the strong and stable foundation laid down by the Ad Hoc Committee last year under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Zahran of Egypt. Based on the assumption that the very purpose of transparency and openness is the building of confidence and security, the prevention of armed conflicts and the promotion of disarmament, I am convinced that the Conference on Disarmament has a definite role to play in this field during the foreseeable future. Allow me, at this point, to express my gratitude to the members of the Conference for the trust and honour bestowed on my country and myself with the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. I want to take this opportunity to give to the Conference my assurances that I will certainly use all my best endeavours to advance our work on the TIA agenda.

Mongolia page: 29

With the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Armaments and the adoption by the United Nations Disarmament Conference of "substantial guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters", the cause of promoting transparency in military matters gained significant momentum. We are confident that a group of governmental experts to be convened this year will address further development of the Register. The Ad Hoc Committee established for the first time in the CD last year had substantive discussions on the complex issues related to transparency in disarmament. Many suggestions and working papers of practical significance were presented to the Ad Hoc Committee. I am convinced that under the guidance of Ambassador György Boytha of Hungary we will make further progress this year.

Poland attaches major importance to the question of transparency in armaments as well as to the issue of confidence-building in the military sphere in general, issues which owing to the positive CSCE experience have for us a special meaning. Thanks to the well-structured debate in the Ad Hoc Committee last year and to the many specific constructive proposals submitted by a number of delegations, that subsidiary organ is now better prepared to pursue the goal of enhanced transparency. Congratulating the distinguished representative of Hungary, Ambassador Boytha, on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, we pledge him full support and constructive cooperation.

In our view, the process of increasing military transparency should be both gradual and non-discriminatory so as to promote and encourage its universal appeal and participation in it. Given this consideration, we are positively disposed towards sustained efforts with a view to developing and expanding the scope of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. In this respect, the proposals submitted last year by France and the United Kingdom seem to be particularly relevant. We also look forward to the results of the meetings of a group of experts, chaired by our distinguished friend and colleague Ambassador Wagenmakers and mandated to explore the possible expansion of both quality and quantity of data in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. We take note of his invitation to delegations for useful input of the CD for the benefit of the group of experts. My delegation shall comply in due course.

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in negotiating an agreement (or at least guidelines) on reducing the flows of conventional arms. Seeking such an agreement now, or perhaps guidelines, may be propitious, as the world conventional arms sales market has been in decline since the late 1980s. A combination of supplier restraint on transfers of the most potent weapons with recipient restraint and increased transparency reflected in an expansion of the existing Register of Conventional Arms would be a very positive development. Such a cooperative relationship between suppliers and recipients would reflect the model embodied in, for instance, the chemical weapons Convention.

Concerning delivery systems, the Missile Technology Control Regime offers short-term and limited-category supplier restraints. But it needs to be underpinned by a global agreement which creates norms adopted by the whole relevant international community.

Netherlands

pages: 7 - 13

In my declaration of 27 January last, I gave the Netherlands' overall assessment of the first year of implementation of United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, entitled "Transparency in armaments". Today, I would like to dwell in some detail on the complementarity of the responsibilities entrusted to the United Nations Secretary-General and the Conference on Disarmament.

The Transparency in Armaments process faces an important year. In October 1993, for the first time, a United Nations Secretary-General's consolidated report on transparency in armaments (A/48/344) appeared. Together with its supplements, this report lists returns for calendar year 1992 submitted by 83 Member States to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. This was a promising start, especially because all major arms suppliers reported and because a significant part, some 90 per cent, of the total number of inter-State arms transfers for the calendar year 1992 was covered.

As for the second consolidated United Nations Secretary-General's report, which will contain returns pertaining to the calendar year 1993, more nations should participate to make the Register truly universal. All United Nations Member States are urged to report their imports and exports in 1993 of arms covered by the seven categories of the Register to the United Nations Secretary-General by 30 April 1994. If individual States have no imports or exports of arms to report, it is nevertheless important to file a "nil return" with the United Nations Secretary-General. All "nil return" is indicative of a nation's willingness to participate in the transparency drive. Submission of a "nil return" is an important political gesture.

The transparency process stands to benefit only if more than the roughly 30 States that have hitherto done so were to provide background information for the Register. Background information should relate to military holdings and procurement through national production, preferably covering the seven categories for arms transfers and following the model of the standardized reporting form used for transfers. Background information should further explain policies concerning arms transfers, and export policies, legislation and administrative procedures regarding the authorization of arms transfers and the prevention of illicit transfers.

Allow me to draw the attention of this Conference to the fact that, also in 1994, a Group of Governmental Experts established by the United Nations Secretary-General under paragraph 11 (b) of United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, has to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development. With a view to enabling that New York Group to base its findings also on the returns by Member States over calendar year 1993, the above-mentioned deadline - 30 April 1994 - for those returns by Member States to the United Nations Register becomes all the more important.

A few words on the work of the 1994 Group of Governmental Experts. First, the mandate of the Group expects them to review the results of the Register in terms of ensuring its continuing operation. This means that the universal and non-discriminatory basis of the Register should be secured and that its overall objective be served. The objective is to enhance transparency, without prejudice to the security of Member States, and to help avoid destabilizing accumulations of arms. To that end the Group of Governmental Experts might recommend some slight procedural fixes to be applied to the standardized reporting form as well as some adjustments to existing categories.

The second task of the expert Group is to formulate recommendations on the further development of the Register. This concerns the possible addition of categories of equipment and expansion of the scope of the Register, for instance by including data on military holdings and procurement through national production. Follow-up action of the United Nations General Assembly on such recommendations will determine the Register's shape and impact for the foreseeable future. A recommendation for using the Register as an instrument for regional consultation and cooperation is another possibility to be considered.

Also here in Geneva, 1994 will be an important year for transparency in armaments. The Conference on Disarmament has devoted the last two years to the necessary and fruitful exploration of this new subject. Specifically in 1993 CD delegations have invested in transparency in armaments by indicating national positions, and submitting working papers and practical proposals on the issue. This year we should try to turn these investments to profit by formulating concrete proposals for increasing openness and transparency in armaments. Such proposals will contribute to building confidence and trust among States and, consequently, will create greater stability, worldwide and regional.

The work of the CD is of direct relevance to the overall transparency process. The CD's responsibility for openness and transparency is neither restricted in time nor in place. The work of the CD is a continuous part of a "family of efforts". Work in Geneva and in New York is complementary: United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/36 L provides for specific responsibilities of the Register on the one hand and of the Conference on Disarmament on the other. While, at least initially, the purpose of the Register is to increase openness and transparency in relation to conventional arms transfers, the CD has a wider, more general task.

The CD will fulfil its responsibility properly only if, under the rubric transparency, it designs and develops measures aimed at reducing and, hopefully, preventing aggravation of conflict situations. The CD should also provide inputs of practical use to the United Nations Register. Indeed, operative paragraph 11 (b) of resolution 46/36 L explicitly mentions that the 1994 Group of Governmental Experts should operate "taking into account the work of the Conference on Disarmament as set forth in paragraphs 12 to 15". In conformity with the global responsibility of the CD for openness and transparency it should be stressed that the application of measures designed and developed here can be both worldwide and regional.

In this respect I may be permitted to dwell for a moment on such measures as applied in my own region. The record of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) speaks for itself. The Stockholm CSBM Document of 1986 has been gradually expanded over the years. The present Vienna Document 1992 contains a wide range of confidence-building measures: an annual exchange of information on military organization, manpower and major weapons and equipment systems; the possibility of verifying that information during evaluation visits; a consultation mechanism for unusual military activities; a programme of visits (to air bases) and military contacts; and a communications system for speedy notifications between Foreign Ministries. At present negotiations about the further development of the Vienna Document continue.

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the CFE Treaty, has also increased openness tremendously. In the Treaty ceilings on heavy weaponry (much like the first five categories of the United Nations Arms Register) have been agreed upon. These ceilings must be reached in November 1995, after a three-year reduction period, the first one having

transpired some time ago. After the first reduction year 17,000 pieces of equipment have been destroyed or converted. More than 1,000 on-site inspections have taken place, among them quite a number of challenge inspections. I can assure you that this large number of inspections contributes considerably to transparency in disarmament.

Numbers and technical data are important, particularly in the framework of the Register. The arms control measures we are supposed to elaborate here in the CD pertain to major weapons platforms, categories of weapons with a proven suitability for cross-border offensive actions, and not to small fry. These systems are relatively easy to identify, define, record and monitor. The elaboration by the CD of practical means to enhance openness and transparency does not need to be a technical and specialist operation. Our task is political. We are not here to excel in mathematics or statistics. Excruciating efforts to define precisely holdings, transfers and equipment will not fulfil our objectives. What we have to elaborate are practical, down-to-earth measures and designs that help neighbours to start trusting each other. Political commitment is a conditio sine qua non in building confidence and increasing stability.

What then are the practical consequences of the CD's responsibility pertaining to transparency in armaments for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on transparency during this year's CD session? The Netherlands delegation would like to offer a number of concrete suggestions.

The CD's Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments should enable the 1994 New York Group of Governmental Experts to take into account, inter alia, the work of the CD in preparing its report to the forty-ninth United Nations General Assembly, according to operative paragraph 11 (b) of resolution 46/36 L. At its first session the United Nations Secretary-General's Group as a whole felt that they should have sound knowledge of the CD's work on the issue. The Group therefore urged its Chairman to write to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments to draw the latter's attention to this CD responsibility, which has important consequences for the Ad Hoc Committee's work this year. The input of the CD would give a useful dimension to the work of the Group in New York. Specifically, views of the CD on practical means to increase openness and transparency related to excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms, military holdings and procurement through national production will be of direct relevance to both the Group and the Register. Consequently, at its second session, starting 31 May 1994, the New York Group should have at its disposal some reflection of the CD's work on transparency in armaments.

In view of the request for a CD contribution, initiated and supported by the whole Group of Governmental Experts, it is regrettable that no consensus has yet been achieved here on the draft work programme of the CD's Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. For me it is hard to conceive how between delegations of one and the same Member State opinions on the same issue can differ so much across the ocean.

As far as the CD's responsibility in the wider framework of transparency in armaments is concerned, my concrete suggestions for action are largely based on existing proposals, submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments in 1993. The CD should elaborate these proposals with a view to developing confidence-building measures. As was put forward by the Ad Hoc Committee's Chairman, Ambassador György Boytha, new proposals are of course to be encouraged.

In the conventional field the following subjects for confidence-building measures present themselves: declarations on the size and organization of armed forces (a British proposal); declarations on the closure or conversion of military production facilities (an Italian proposal); international data exchange of military holdings and procurement through national production (a United States proposal); complementary regional measures to enhance transparency in armaments (a Japanese proposal); and a code of conduct, a Polish suggestion, yet to be elaborated. Similar ideas were brought to the fore by Ireland, New Zealand and Romania to bring about voluntary restraint and responsibility in conventional arms transfers.

The CD's Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments can certainly do useful work on the acute problem posed by the present-day use of anti-personnel land-mines. This question has both political and humanitarian dimensions. In the view of the Netherlands delegation, the attention of the multilateral arms control community is warranted. We are all aware of recent initiatives, expressed in resolutions during the forty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly last year. Now the CD is seized of this issue, as is the United Nations Secretary-General's Group of Governmental Experts on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. There is, however, a slight danger that the well-intended efforts might slightly suffer from fragmentation and lack of focus. Without prejudice to the ultimate forum to be chosen, what the Ad Hoc Committee can do at least is work towards a consensus view on the proper parameters for action.

The CD's mandate further includes the elaboration of practical means to increase openness and transparency related to weapons of mass destruction. Discussions in the CD on this contentious issue are still in a preliminary phase. It seems useful to make a distinction here between transfers on the one hand and holdings and procurement on the other. As to transfers, I underline that after the entry into force of the chemical weapons Convention - to be expected in about a year's time - there will exist a coherent interlocking network of international agreements prohibiting any transfer of any weapon of mass destruction. As for holdings and procurement of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty recognizes the existence of five nuclear-weapon States. All other holdings and procurement of nuclear weapons is prohibited by international law. The Geneva Protocol, the chemical weapons Convention and the biological weapons Convention between them prohibit any design, possession, production and use of chemical and biological weapons respectively.

Netherlands continued .... **pages: 12, 13**

Now, the basic assignment of the Conference on Disarmament seems to be to see to it that the transparency process would in due course yield comprehensive data and information on military outlays as well as on aggregate military force structures. This is certainly a long haul. It should not be forgotten, however, that a good deal of information on nuclear holdings is already in the public domain. For instance, the full texts of treaties like START and START II are issued as documents of the CD, and are thus widely disseminated. These texts provide information on the size of the nuclear arsenals of the two States concerned.

Important support for making progress is to be derived from the almost universal adherence to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system. Regional arrangements, like the Euratom Treaty, and zones free of nuclear weapons or nuclear-free zones, such as the ones established by the recently reinforced Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga, are further invaluable mechanisms conducive to a general environment of cooperative security and trust. The same holds true, mutatis mutandis, for the brand-new Convention on chemical weapons, with its innovative verification provisions.

It is now for us here in the Conference on Disarmament to capitalize further on what has already been achieved. As additional practical means to increase openness and transparency in nuclear matters, one could think of a confidence-building measure under which nuclear-weapon States might voluntarily supply more information on their nuclear arms holdings and the scale of the reductions of those holdings. A policy of transparency could also be developed with regard to plutonium stocks. This could ease the future elaboration of a "cut-off" treaty, which would definitely be another step along the way indicated in article VI of the NPT. Recommendations for advance notification of major military manoeuvres involving nuclear arms might be agreed upon here in the CD.

Resolution 46/36 L further requests the CD to address the issue of transfers of high technology with military applications. While elaborating the practical means requested by the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament may establish that export controls are a necessary complement to international agreements prohibiting transfers or the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. States that do abide by the international commitments appertaining thereto have no reason to worry about export control regimes.

Allow me to sum up. I am convinced that the CD can develop valuable recommendations for concrete measures to increase openness and transparency, on the basis of the above-mentioned and other, additional, proposals. It is a "family of efforts" which contributes to the success of the transparency in armaments' exercise now an object of consensus. These efforts are intended to encourage responsibility and self-restraint. The overall objective is cooperative security. In this way disarmament and international security are truly approached in an integrated manner. At the national level, the prospect is held out of reallocation of scarce socio-economic resources, without detriment to the security of member States. And it is in a secure environment that investment flourishes.

There are meaningful patterns of action which the CD and its Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments can develop to further transparency with regard to holdings and procurement through national production. Furthermore, in extending, in a tangible fashion, the transparency concept to the development of parallel measures, both in the domain of weapons of mass destruction and with regard to transfers of high technology with military applications, the CD will be executing the mandate entrusted to it by the United Nations General Assembly to the full. Thus conceived and perceived, the transparency drive, and - for that matter - the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as an integral part of it, will come to fruition. In short, the CD can achieve much for the security of us all.